The Russian Rebellion: The End, Or The End Of The Beginning?

“When you strike at a king, you must kill him.” (Ralph Waldo Emerson)

I think the unexpected end to Prigozhin’s march on Moscow requires me to wrap-up my article A Russian Coup? with some final thoughts. I was going to write this sooner, but it kept playing out like a slow-motion train wreck.

Recap

On Friday June 23, Prigozhin rounded up his Wagner group and started to march on Moscow. He made it clear that this move was to hold accountable those he believed responsible for the purported attack on Wagner camps and the mishandling of the war. These were thinly veiled threats against the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu and the head of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov. Prigozhin had a bitter and public feud with these two for several months in which he was prolific in making audio and video recordings he posted to Tic Tok denouncing them.

Prigozhin and his troops rapidly rolled unopposed, except for a few ineffective Russian air strikes, through Rostov-on-Don, a Russian city 674 miles south of Moscow. They then continued north to within 120 to 124 miles of Moscow by Saturday afternoon. On their way, they downed seven aircraft, mostly helicopters but at least one command-and-control jet.

Most of the Russian army was in Ukraine, and what was left in Russia was out of position to block Prigozhin. Instead, Putin had to rely on the Rosgvardia, a force created in 2016 that reports directly to him.  One of the Rosgvardia’s missions is the suppression of internal dissent. Though some of these units have the capability of a motorized infantry unit, they are overall relatively lightly armed compared to regular army units.

As Prigozhin rolled through southern Russia there were reports that he met with at least some and maybe significant support from the locals. There were also some reports of regular army personnel joining him and his Wagner group. Again, the reports were sparse and should be taken with a grain of salt, but they do indicate there was dissention within the Russian army and populace as to whom to back.

So, with the road open and only light forces protecting Moscow, why did Prigozhin suddenly accept a deal brokered by Belarusian President Lukashenko? The deal required Wagner forces to return to their camps and Prigozhin to accept what appears to be exile to Belarus. The deal also spells the end of Wagner by “offering” its troops the opportunity to sign contracts with the Russian army, return home as civilians, and at least for some, to go to Belarus with Prigozhin. In return, Putin dropped the charges against Prigozhin for armed rebellion and will not prosecute others who participated. Notably there is no mention of sacking Shoigu or Gerasimov. To the contrary, today Putin awarded Shoigu a medal for stopping the rebellion. In short, Prigozhin got nothing he wanted and lost everything he had. 

So why did Prigozhin accept the deal? No one can be absolutely sure of what actually went on, but I think we can conclude the following.

First, Prigozhin miscalculated pretty much everything. I’m convinced he thought he could limit his rebellion to getting his two enemies - Shoigu or Gerasimov - replaced by making a show of force. That belief went up in smoke early Saturday when Putin publicly condemned him as a traitor who stabbed the country in the back and ordered his arrest for armed rebellion. Once Putin took these actions, Prigozhin went from a protest leader to a rebel. His only two choices then became take the Kremlin and seize power, or accept a deal. His forces while formidable were not sufficient for the task, especially given that Putin had purportedly flown off to St. Petersburg.

Second, he overlooked, or at least did not plan for the reaction of the Chechens. I think it surprised Prigozhin that Kadyrov - the Chechen leader - sent troops in support of Putin. Why Prigozhin didn’t think of this possibility is baffling. Kadyrov has proven to be loyal to Putin, at least when it comes to power struggles among the Russian elites. Additionally, Kadyrov has publicly feuded with Prigozhin in the past.

Though the Chechen troops got bogged down in traffic and would not have gotten to Moscow before Prigozhin - they would have gotten there soon after and provided Putin with a significant boost in military power.

As Tatiana Stanovaya states, and I agree:

Prigozhin was caught off-guard by Putin's reaction and found himself unprepared to assume the role of a revolutionary. He also wasn't prepared for the fact that Wagner was about to reach Moscow where his only option remained - to "take the Kremlin" - an action that would inevitably result in him and his fighters being eradicated.

Third, Prigozhin seems to have overestimated his influence among the Russian elites. Though he seems to have had some, if not significant support among the population and some with lower ranking military personnel, he did not receive much, if any support from the Russian elites in positions of power.

With no support from the elites and the Chechens marching on him, Prigozhin’s choices were to either accept the deal or become a martyr. Prigozhin is ugly, not stupid so he took the deal.

Now what happens? Well both Putin and Prigozhin have been weakened.

Putin by having the man he created and the private army he not only encouraged but used to expand both his personal power and Russian influence globally openly challenging him. Not only did Prigozhin challenge Putin but went so far as to state Putin had picked the wrong side and would be replaced as President, all while leading a well-equipped military force through southwest Russia on its way to Moscow. In short, Putin showed he’s not invincible and has some weaknesses - very ungood for Putin who relies on an aura of invincibility to maintain power.

Now that Putin has shown some weakness, I suspect there will be more than a little maneuvering among the elites to increase their power base and position themselves to succeed Putin, or if the opportunity arises, replace him. Some may think this is a good thing, but I wonder. Any power clash among the elites only creates instability. And instability in a country with 5,977 nuclear warheads is not a good thing.

Putin will also have to decide who he can still trust, if any.  Prigozhin was at one time close to him and a loyal supporter. Prigozhin’s disloyalty will create significant distrust, which will be disruptive to the leadership.

Because Putin has been weakened, I suspect he will attempt to tighten his grip on power even more. In the short run I think he’ll be able to do so, but I’m not sure he’ll be able to maintain it in the long term.

Prigozhin’s “rebellion” has exposed that there are at least some, if not significant problems for Putin to overcome. Many civilians turned out in of support for Prigozhin and there were reports that at least some Russian army members defected to Wagner. I believe this was more of an anti-Putin movement than a pro-Prigozhin one, which means it will not be resolved by the removal of Prigozhin.  How widespread are these problems? No one really knows. But they are real and indicate the loyalty to Putin within the army, elites, and society may be waning.

As for Prigozhin, well he has been more than weakened. After all his incendiary statements and threats, he accepted Putin’s deal and went off to what amounts to exile in Belarus while Wagner is being dismantled. Who can support a person who not only backed down after all the bluster, but also allows his organization - Wagner - to be dismantled?

Even though Prigozhin is in exile, Putin, not known as a forgiving person, still sees him as a potential threat. Therefore, I would advise Prigozhin to stay away from windows above the third floor. Least he falls out one of them like so many of his fellow elites who upset Putin.

If Prigozhin had thought more about the end game and less about his Tic Tok videos, he would have realized there were only two possible outcomes for his actions. He could take the Kremlin, depose Putin, and seize power - which I think was always a long shot, like being hit by lightning when there are no clouds. The other was to become a footnote in Russian history. For the moment it seems he chose to be a footnote…but this story may yet have another chapter.