Incompetent Leadership Is A Danger To National Security And Civil Liberties
"Incompetence is the true crisis." (Albert Einstein)
Let’s talk about the “leak” of classified documents by Airman 1st Class Teixeira, a member of the Air National Guard assigned to the 102nd Intelligence Wing. From what I see, we have two separate problems:
- The incompetency and/or gross negligence of our leaders; and
- The over classification of information.
So far we know Teixeira is an E3 - a very junior enlisted person - with a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance who was assigned to the IT department of an intelligence unit. The available evidence also shows he posted hundreds of classified documents in a private chat room with about 20 members, all under 20. From there the classified material literally spread throughout the world.
Merely because a person has a TS/SCI does not mean he has access to all material classified at or below that level. Nope. In addition to the appropriate clearance, he must have a “need to know” before he can access any classified information. For example, a person with a TS who works on nuclear submarine propulsion systems would have access to TS information concerning the specific propulsion systems she works on. However, she would not have access to TS, or even confidential information concerning nuclear weapons the submarine could carry.
Likewise, Teixeira’s TS/SCI clearance would allow him access to classified information he needed to maintain the IT system he worked on. However, he would not have access to any other information that could be accessed by those systems. Yet, Teixeira accessed and disclosed information regarding the war in Ukraine, Chinese weapons development, the Wagner PMC’s quest to obtain weapons; Wagner’s attempt to get Haiti to hire them to combat gangs; Egypt’s consideration of selling missiles to Russia; summaries of internal discussions among some of Russia’s military and intelligence agencies and more.
Which brings us to the question - how the hell did an E3 IT person obtain access to this wide ranging, highly classified information? CBS reports that the criminal complaint against Teixeira:
provides a description of how investigators used information from an unnamed U.S. government agency that "has access to logs of certain documents" to track how Teixeira allegedly used his clearance in February to look for a specific document that he later posted on a small Discord channel the following day…
And
Teixeira on April 6 "used his government computer to search classified intelligence reporting for the word 'leak.'"
The criminal complaint shows that Teixeira had unfettered access to a secure network where a significant amount, if not all of our classified intelligence information is stored, even though he did not have a “need to know.” How else would he be able to use "his government computer to search classified intelligence reporting for the word 'leak'" or conduct a computer search “for a specific document?” (emphasis mine).
What’s more scary, is security was so lax at the 102nd Intelligence Wing that since July 2022 Teixeira took highly classified documents home, transcribe and/or photographed them, and then posted them to a ‘private’ Discord chat room. Think about it, this guy was able to stroll out the door of a secure facility with highly classified documents for 8 months, transcribe and photograph them at home, and then post them to a chat room without anyone in his unit or counter espionage services knowing anything about it for 8 months. Further, as of this writing no one seems to know how many classified documents Teixeira disclosed. In the criminal complaint the government claims “dozens,” CBS reports reviewing “over 50,” and the Washington Post reports reviewing “about 300.” But it gets worse.
In late February 2023 one of the teenage chat room geniuses posted dozens of the photos in another Discord chat room associated with the Youtuber wow_mao.1 From there others posted the documents in more Discord chat rooms. By April 5 the documents began showing up on 4chan and pro-Russian Telegram channels, and finally they made their way to Twitter.
Unbelievably, it was not until the documents showed up on Twitter - 8 months after the first one was posted on Discord - that our crack intelligence services figured out they had a problem. You can’t make this stuff up.
Of course now the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, and the Pentagon, have all started investigations to ensure this never happens again. Alas, we’ve heard the same thing after the Manning and Snowden leaks…and yet here we are.
This latest leak, like the Manning and Snowden leaks, are not due to a lack of security procedures, but due to the failure of leadership to enforce the existing ones. It’s past time to hold those who not only violate those procedures, but also those who fail to enforce them accountable. At a minimum accountability requires the removal of failed leaders, and where appropriate the filing of criminal charges. I’d suggest we start at the top and work down.
Over classification and unlawfully classifying information.
In addition to failing to follow security procedures, we also have a significant ‘over classification’ problem. The statutory authority for classifying documents seems to be the Espionage Act, codified by 18 U.S. Code § 792 et seq. However, what specific types of information may be classified and which level of classification information receives is governed by Executive Order 13526 (EO 13526).
There are three classification levels, Top Secret (TS), Secret, and Confidential. There are also subclassifications such as “Sensitive Compartmented Information” (SCI), which allows a person with a TS clearance access to our most sensitive classified information - if they have a need to know.
There are two criteria that must be met in order to classify information. First, the information would harm national security if disclosed. To be classified Top Secret the information would cause "exceptionally grave" damage; Secret would cause "serious damage;" and confidential would cause "damage" to our national security if disclosed. The information must also relate to one of 8 specific areas.2 In summary, information being classified must at a minimum cause at least some damage (confidential) to our national security AND fall into one of 8 categories. However, some, if not much of the classified information leaked by Teixeira should not have been classified because it would not have caused damage to our national security and/or does not fit into one of the 8 required categories.
One example is the ‘leaked’ documents shows the government classified the fact that there were 4 Chinese spy balloons that flew across at least parts of the U.S. - 3 the public did not know about and the one we shot down - after it was allowed to meander across the U.S. gathering intelligence. They also classified information that a spy balloon flew over one of our carrier battle groups. It’s unclear whether this is a fifth spy balloon, or is one of the four that later flew over the U.S.
Disclosing there was not one, but four Chinese spy balloons could not harm our national security. Think about it, the Chinese knew they were flying spy balloons across the U.S., they knew we knew, and reporting the existence of the spy balloons would not disclose the method or means we used to discover them. The only reason to classify this information would be to keep it from the American public in order to avoid public outrage or government embarrassment - neither of which are reasons to classify information and both of which violate EO 13526.
Then there’s the special forces (SF) in Ukraine. According to the BBC, one of the leaked documents shows that 5 NATO countries have a total of 97 SF personnel in Ukraine, 14 of which are American. The information as to the other countries with military personal in Ukraine would be classified under EO 13526 (information received from a foreign government) and it could damage our national security by causing those governments to restrict the exchange of future classified information between the US and our allies. However, classifying the presence of our SF in Ukraine is problematic.
U.S. military operations can be classified if the disclosure of those operations would damage our national security. However, when the leaked documents became public, our government spokespersons assured us that U.S. military personnel in Ukraine are there strictly to conduct inspections of U.S. weapons delivered to Ukraine and serve as embassy security. They are not there to take part in the conflict as combatants.
Assuming these statements are true, then the information about the 14 SF troops in Ukraine should not be classified. I guess you could stretch the definition of “military operation” far enough to cram SF being used as weapon inspectors or embassy security into it. However, even if you did, disclosing this information certainly wouldn’t damage national security and so it could not be classified under EO 13526. At most, you could classify the number of SF troops providing embassy security, but not their presence.
The other possibility is that our SF troops are doing more than conducting weapons inspections or providing embassy security. However, if that’s the case, then the administration would have to comply with 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(2) requiring the executive branch to inform Congress within 48 hours if any U.S. troops are sent “into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces.” Note that § 1543(a)(2) applies to troops “equipped for combat,” they don’t have to be taking part in combat.
If the SF forces are equipped for combat, then the operation could be classified - if congress was informed. If this is the case, then the Administration has explicitly lied to the public, or at the very least grossly mislead us, and congress is complicit in the lie by remaining silent. Conversely, if the Administration committed combat equipped troops and did not inform congress, then they are in violation of 50 USC § 1543 and classification of the information violates EO 13526, which prohibits the classification of unlawful activity to avoid it being discovered.
So which is it - an over classification of information concerning military weapons inspectors and embassy security forces; a correct classification and the Administration and Congress lying to the public; or unlawfully classifying the operation to prevent discovery of an illegal act?
There are other examples of over classification, but I think these two suffice to drive the point home.
Don’t get me wrong, a lot of the information that Teixeira illegally disclosed was appropriately classified, and it’s disclosure damaged our national security. However, that does not justify the over classification and/or unlawful classification of other information.
Let’s be honest, we need to be able to keep secrets necessary for our national security. We also must recognize that keeping information from the public can, and has, allowed the government to engage in a wide range of illegal acts, often resulting in the denial of civil liberties. Therefore, it’s past time that we demand the government classifies as little information as possible, and ensures that those responsible for safe keeping what is classified are at least competent. In other words it’s time we purge those in a position of leadership who are incompetent, negligent, or simply ignore the laws. This is not too much to ask, though it seems too much to expect.
I looked at Wow_Mao’s Youtube channel so I could explain it to you, alas, if you are interested it’s best you see it yourself.
(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations; (b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security; (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security; or (h) the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.